Why Do Things Look As They Do?

THE MAJOR TRADITIONS    As we 
have seen, the answer to this 
question for the major 
traditions of thought would be: 
for the inference theory, 
things look as they do because 
of the inferences we make 
about what given stimuli (or 
sensations) most likely 
represent in the world; for the 
information-processing theory, 
because of the sequence of 
representations and 
computations that occur 
following registration of the 
stimulus; for the Gestalt 
theory, because of the 
spontaneous interactions in 
the brain to which the 
components of the stimulus 
give rise; for the stimulus (or 
psychophysical) theory, 
because of the sufficient 
information we receive from 
the stimulus.

    In examining the current 
scene in psychology, one 
hardly finds a controversy 
raging among defenders of 
these differing viewpoints. For 
the most part, one finds an 
eclectic approach to theory in 
which features of each of the 
major traditions are 
incorporated into a more or less 
unintegrated set of beliefs. 
Thus, for example, many 
acknowledge that past 
experience plays at least some 
role in perception, but they do 
not believe that past 
experience takes the form of 
unconscious inference or that 
it derives from the sense of 
touch. Many acknowledge the 
role of organization and of 
configurational or holistic 
effects not reducible to the sum 
of parts, but nonetheless feel 
that these phenomena remain 
unexplained. And, of course, 
all acknowledge the necessary 
role of the stimulus and of 
certain information contained 
within it that may not be 
simple or obvious, although 
they would not maintain that 
perception can be fully 
explained by the stimulus.